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Abstract
Based on • the neo-classical theory of time allocation, consumption
and production we estimate a particular econometric model for Lima and the
rural areas of Peru. This model is well suited for carrying out policy
simulations on how households time allocation and the income distribution
are affected from different policy measures such as increased schooling and
wage rates. The econometric model is sufficiently general to account for
simultaneous decisions on time allocation in large households both across
sectors (wage work and selfemployment) and across adult family members.
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1. INTRODUCTION
At the outset a micro-econometric analysis of the neo-classical
type may seem problematic for the Peruvian labor market. First, the country
is rather complex and heterogeneous with respect to geography, cultural
traditions and social and economic conditions. Second, it may be argued
that the paradigm of rational behavior is not the best point of departure
in order to conceptualize and describe behavior in developing countries.
The impact of traditional values and customs may for example strongly in-
fluence households allocation of time between females and males.
Also severe restrictions on individuals choices may be of great im-
portance. Even if one accepts the neo-classical framework as a reasonable
description one might still be sceptical towards the possibility of under-
taking a rigorous empirical analysis. This is so because this type of
approach requires reasonably accurate data on a number of household econo-
mic variables as well as choice constraints. Also the extreme heterogeneity
makes it hard to develop and estimate realistic econometric models.
The present study is an attempt to apply the neo-classical theory
to analyze household behavior in Peru.
To summarize the main idea here consider a household consisting of
husband and wife. This household is supposed to maximize a utility function
with respect to male and female hours of work and consumption subject to
the (static) budget constraint. This utility function depends on the age
of each person and of numbers of small children. While the theoretical
model is the same as those found in the literature, the econometric formu-
lation we use is quite different. This follows from the fact that we postu-
late different assumptions on the stochastic error terms in the model. The
labor supply functions that correspond to the utility function are not
linear in the parameters. However, our assumptions imply convenient expres-
sion for the probability distribution of (observed) consumption and labor
supply. This distribution is a function of the parameters of the utility
function and it is utilized in a maximum likelihood estimation procedure.
Ones the parameters of the utility function has been estimated we can use
it to simulate individual household responses.
At present, empirical results for Lima and the rural areas are re-
ported. Here the household utility framework mentioned above is extended,
to include allocation of time between wage work and selfemployment in which
the output is represented by a profit or a gross revenue function.
Since 1985 when the data were collected the Peruvian economy has
entered a severe recession. The question is then if the results obtained
under totally different economic conditions have any value under today's or
future conditions. One possible attitute is the following:
It is of fundamental interest to apply empirically founded behavio-
ral models to assess the labor supply response and the corresponding impact
on economic welfare from various policy measures. Specifically, given
similar conditions of the Peruvian economy as of 1985 our study suggests
how, for example, different measures would affect labor supply behavior and
economic inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a verbal
description of the main feature and analytic approach. In Section 3 we
describe at some detail the particular econometric formulation on which our
study is based and in Section 4 this general framework is adapted to the
rural areas of Peru. This section also contains the estimation results for
the rural areas. Section 5 contains the specification and the estimation
results for Lima and Section 6 yields the economic interpretation of the
empirical results.
2. SUMMARY OF ANALYTIC APPROACH
The purpose of the analysis is to estimate an econometric model
that is convenient for simulating certain types of policy experiments. What
we consentrate on here is to study the effect on production, consumption
and time allocation from changes in education and wage rates. For example,
we would like to answer how many men and women would participate in wage
work if education were increased. Furthermore, we are interested in how
policy changes of the types mentioned above would affect the mean level and
the degree of inequality in the distribution of income and welfare.
The theoretical model is based on the neo-classical model for con-
sumption and allocation of time. Provided the data are not corrupted by
measurement error it seems natural to us to apply this framework. Our
justification is:
• ) No one can spend more than their income. In other words, the econo-
nomic budget constraint plays a crucial role.
Similarly there is a time constraint, the sum of hours spent on
different activities cannot exceed 24 hours per day.
It is reasonable to assume that people are not indifferent with re-
spect to different levels of leisure and consumption. Thus it makes
sense to introduce the notion of preferences and to represent these
by utility indexes.
In the standard models of labor supply the decision-maker is
assumed to maximize utility with respect to leisure and consumption subject
to the budget constraint given wages and prices. One major objection
against this framework is that individuals and households in developing
countries can hardly be viewed as having full freedom of choice. On the
contrary, they most likely often face severe constraints related to job and
production opportunities. The set of feasible opportunities a particular
individual (household) faces is influenced by the individual's education,
experience and training, by the structure of the economy and the general
economic policy, by specific policy programs (for example health programs
and development of infrastructure and transportation in rural areas) by
climatic condition and ecological changes, etc. Accordingly, it seems
natural that a realistic economic model of household behavior should in
some sense acommodate variations in opportunities across households.
The particular econometric approach taken in the present study
differs somewhat from the standard models in the labor supply literature.
In our model the underlying decision variable is latent and is denoted
position. By position, we mean a particular combination of market and non-
market activities. Examples are work associates with certain types of
agricultural production, combined with work in a particular wage earning
job. A position is characterized by specific attributes like type and
level of output and input factors, hours of work, wage rates related to
wage earning jobs, etc. Given the position these attributes are assumed
fixed. The choice problem is viewed as one in which the individuals of the
household select the best "package" (maximizes utility) of attributes from
a set of feasible attributes. This choice set is assumed known to the
household but it is unobservable to us as econometricians. The set of
household specific feasible positions is represented in the model by a
distribution function which is called the opportunity distribution (densi-
ty). The opportunity density represents an aggregate measure of the choice
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opportunities and it is defined, loosely spoken, as the fraction of posi-
tions with specific attributes that are feasible to the household. For
example, if the attributes are job-specific hours and wages and profit in
own farm production the opportunity density measures the amount of posi-
tions with a specific level of wages, hours and profit that are feasible.
Due to unobserved heterogeneity in opportunities across households it is
natural to interpret the opportunity density as a probability density. Spe-
cifically, it is the probability that a particular position-specific
attribute-combination is feasible to a (randomly selected) household. This
type of approach was developed and applied by Dagsvik (1988), Dagsvik
and Strom (1989), and it is related to the model developed by Ben-Akiva et
al. (1985).
In the following section an outline of the econometric model is
specified and the estimation procedure is described. Our final model is a
simultaneous model in consumption, hours of work, wage rates, and profit
conditional on family size and schooling. By "conditional" we mean that we
have specified a conditional density for (optimally chosen) hours of work,
consumption, wage rates and output given the optimally chosen family size
and schooling. In other words (given the particular underlying assumptions
of our model) the model is consistent with the notion of simultaneous
choice in all the attributes mentioned above including schooling and family ,
size.
The introduction of the opportunity distribution in addition to the
specification of a household utility function is obviously appealing but it
also raises new problems related to functional form and the identification
of parameters related to the opportunity density and to the utility func-
tion. Even if the parameters of the utility funaion and of the opportuni-
ty density cannot be fully identified without strong assumptions, the
present formulation has nevertheless the advantage in that it suggests a
natural and convenient way of taking into account unobserved heterogeneity
in opportunities and how to introduce variables that characterize indivi-
dual qualifications as well as variables that characterize the community
and the environment. At the present stage of the project the opportunity
density is specified as a function of the individuals (belonging to the
household) education. Specifically, the fraction of feasible wage work po-
sitions is specified as a function of years of schooling. Similarly the
fraction of informal selfemployment positions (non-agricultural) is speci-
fied as a function of level of schooling. This enables us to simulate the
effect of increased education on the allocation of time in different
sectors through increased sets of market opportunities, while keeping the 
wage rate and the preferences fixed. Similarly, we can study the effect of
schooling through increased wage rates while keeping the opportunity
density fixed.
The essential postulate that ensures identification is that the
opportunity density with respect to offered hours is assumed uniform which
means that we assume no contraints on hours of work (given that work in the
respective sectors is available). The offered wage distribution across
wage work positions, conditional on education, is assumed to be log normal
with mean dependent on experience and level of schooling (splines). The
opportunity density of the profit conditional on the input hours is assumed
log normal with mean that is consistent with a translog type specification.
We do, however, not distinguish between profit from agricultural and non-
agricultural selfemployment.
The preferences are represented in the model by a utility function
thAt is additively separable in consumption and in each of the individuals
leisure. The leisure terms are parameterized as a function of age and for
females we have added the number of children below six years of age in in-
teraction with hours of work in the wage sector.
The parameters of the opportunity density and of the utility func-
tion are estimated simultaneously by a modified maximum likelihood proce-
dure. We have also estimated the wage equations and the gross revenue
function by OLS. The OLS procedure may lead to biased estimates since it
neglects that households do not maximize profit but the joint utility of
consumption and leisure. Consequently, the conditional expectation of the
error term in the profit function given the input hours is in general a
function of these hours because they enter the utility function through
consumption and leisure.
3. AN ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING LABOR SUPPLY AND INFORMAL
SELFEMPLOYMENT PRODUCTION IN THE PRESENCE OF LATENT CHOICE SETS
3.1. A discrete version
This section focuses on the essential features of our framework and
its relationship to the traditional approach in the empirical analyzes of
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labor supply (see e.g. Killingsworth, 1983). For the sake of expository
simplicity we shall take the case of a single individual. The traditional
approach starts by postulating a direct (or indirect) utility function in
leisure (non-market activities) and consumption from which the labor supply
function is derived by maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint.
(Alternatively, the labor supply function is postulated directly so as to
be consistent with a well-defined utility function). In this approach it
is usually assumed that the individual is free to adjust his hours of work,
i.e., rarely is the notion of rationing with respect to job offers or hours
of work taken into account. Another feature of most empirical models is the
assumption of linear supply curves. As is wellknown, linear supply functi-
ons implies a particular and quite restrictive form of the utility function
which seems unjustified a priori. For example it implies that the so
called "backward bending case" is excluded a priori.
The alternative empirical approach we offer here is also within the
neo-classical theory but it departs from the common econometric specifica-
tions used by others.
We assume that the essential choice variable is "job" or "position"
and that hours of work and wage rate is completely determined ones the
position is given. By position we understand a particular combination of
market and non-market activities. For example, one position may be defined
as the performance of certain amounts of specific tasks in farmwork com-
bined with playing soccer after work. Thus hours of work and wage rates
are attributes that characterize the positions. Let (H i , WO be the hours-
wage combination of position j. Here j is an indexation of the position.
For non-market positions, W=O. The individual's choice set consists of a
set of positions which is assumed known to him but unobserved by the eco-
nometrician. Only the realized hours of work and wage rates are observed
i.e., the hours-wage combination that is associated with the optimally
chosen position.
3.1.1. A one-sector model
To make the exposition of the main ideas of the econometrics as
simple as possible we shall first assume that the set of feasible positi-
ons, B, (choice set) is finite (relative to the individual).
The individual's maximization problem can now be described formally
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as below.
The budget constraints are given by
(3.1 ) 	 h =
(3.2 ) 	 C - H.W + I
(3.3)
where I is non-labor income. Eq. (3.1) states that for a given position j,
hours of work is given. The third equation states that B is the set of
feasible positions. Eq.(3.2) is the standard economic budget constraint.
Let
U(h,C,j) 	 = 	 v(h,C) + e j
be the individual's utility of position, j. We assume i that this utility
can be decomposed in a structural term, v(h,C), (common to observationally
identical individual's) and a random term, c j , that reflects that individu-
als differ in their preferences for positions with the same level of hours
and consumption. Thus e j takes into account heterogeneity in tastes across
individuals with respect to positions as well as unobserved attributes of
the positions.
The individual's problem is to find the position j E B that maxi-
mizes
Hj Wi +I) + e j .
Now let B(h,w) be the set of positions for which H=h, Wi =w, jEB and let
n(h,w) be the number of positions in B(h,w).
Formally, the probability that the optimal position has hours-wage
combination (h,w) is expressed as




Moreover, if we assume that the random preference terms, c j , are inde-
pendent, extreme value distributed across positions we get immediately from
the formal theory of discrete choice as developed by McFadden (1973) (see
Maddala 1983)) that





g(h,w) 	 = n(h,w) 
n(x,y)
x,y
be the fraction of feasible positions with hours and wages equal to (h,w).
By inserting in (3.4) we get
(3.5) 	 cp(h,w) 	 = g(h,w)exp(v(h,hw+I)) 
2 g(x,y)exp(v(x,xy+I)) •
x,y
This model is analogous to the one developed by Ben-Akiva et al. (1985).
The function cp expresses the labor supply density. It's observable
counterpart is the fraction of individuals who work h hours at wage rate w.
Instead of the usual specifications where the labor supply density is , ex-
pressed as a function of the parameters of the labor supply function we
realize from (3.5) that in our model the density is expressed as a
function directly of the structural part of the utility function.
Moreover, this model allows the notion of rationing. Specifically,
(3.5) expresses the aggregate labor supply as a simple function of the mean
utility, v, and of the opportunity density, g(h,w).
3.1.2. Extension to two sectors
Let us next consider a particular extension to the case where the
individual has the choice of participating in two sectors: One is wage
work and the other is informal selfemployment. In this case the set of
feasible positions consists of combinations of market activities and type
of production. Thus a specific position defines type of wage work, and
type of production, etc. To a position j there correspond attributes
(n ;
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where nj and H 	 hours of work in wage work and selfemployment, 	 Wi
is the wage rate, T i is a variable characterizing technology (unobservable)
associated with position j.
Now the budget constraints take the form
(3.6
	 =	 Fi i • + Y i + I
(3.7) 	 Y i 	=	 F(H i )
where F(H.)T. is the profit function conditional on hours and Y i is profit.J	 J
For expository convenience we assume the structure to be of the multipli-
cative form. The individual's problem is to find the position for which
max(v(n i +H j ,fl j • + F0-10 j + I) + c i
jEB
is obtained. Analogously to g(h,w) let now g(h ,h 2 ,w t) be the fraction of
positions with
c ri i = 	 j =h2,jW W, Tj =t)




which means that we may express the fraction of feasible positions,
g(h ,h ,w,y), for which
(H j .41 1 , 44 2 , wj =w, j =y )
as
(3.8 h ,w,y) 	 = 	 g(h w' 'F(1.12)1
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Now by a straight forward extension of the above derivation of the labor
supply density (3.5) we get the joint density of hours, wage and profit
(3.9)	 (p
g(111,h2,w,y)exp(v(111+h2,h1w+y+I))
h ,h 2 ,w,y •g(x l ,x? ,x3 ,x4 )exp(v(x l +x2 ,x 1 x3 +x4 +I))
(X1 ,x2 ,x3 ,X4 )
To ensure identification we shall make the following additional
assumptions. The first one is expressed as
*
	(3.10) g(h 1 ,h 2 ,w,t)
	
= 	 g l g l g2(11 1,h2 )g3(w) g4( t
for h 1 >0, h 2 >0, where g i and g i are the fractions of wage work and self-
employment positions with positive hours, g3 (w) and g4 (t) are the frac-
tions of positions with Wi =w and Tj =t>0 that are feasible, respectively.
Assumption (3.10) means that there is no correlation between the attributes
of the positions (apart from nj ,[1 . ). Furthermore we assume that 9 2 is a
bivariate uniform density on
{h 1 -Fh 2 	,	 h l >. 1, 	 h 	 >. 1)
which means that
(3.11 g2(11,h2) 	 . 	 2
N(N-l )
given h 1 >0, h 2 >0 .
Given h 2 =0,
Def.
(3.12) g21(h1) 	 = g2(h1 ,0 ) 	 =
and given 11 1 =0,
Def.
( 3 - 13 ) g22(h2) 	 = g2(0, h2) 	 7
O< 	 N,
< h 2 	N,
where N is an upper bound on hours of work.
The assumptions (3.11)-(3.13) mean that there are no constraints on
hours apart from the physical one h 1 +h 2 	N.
By (3.9), (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13) we obtain
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(3.14a) qh (h 1 ,h2 ,w,y 2 gi 4 (w)g4 (73i4
) exp (v(h +h ,h l w+y+I))
MN(N-1)
for 	 h1>0, h2 >0, y>0, w>0,
(3.14c) (1) 1 0 1 ,0,w,0
1- 1) g g4(rilh2, ) exp Iv(h 2 , y+I))
MN
1-g 1 ) g3 (w) exp (v(11 1 ,h 1 w+I))
MN
(3.14b) (00,h 2 ,y) -
for 	 h 	 y>0,











exp v(x 2 ,x +I))
1 -+ 	 g 1 (1-g i ) 	 g3 (x3 ) exp (v(x i , x3 x 1 +1) ) .
>0,x3 >0
The case (3.14a) corresponds to interior solutions while (3.14b) and
(3.14c) correspond to corner solutions, respectively. Several conditional
densities are of particular interest. For example (3.14) implies that the
conditional wage density given hours, input and gross revenue is given by
(3.16 (1)2 (w h ,h 2 ,y) =
g3 (w) exp (v(h 1 +h 2 ,h w+y+I))
g3 (x ) exp (v(h +h 2 ,11 x3 +y+I))
x3 >0
which illustrates the so-called selectivity bias, namely that the conditi-
onal density of the realized wage differ from the offered wage density,
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g3 (w), because preferences represented by v(h,C) imply that the realized
wage deviates from the offered ones. Similarly, the density of the realized
(optimal) value, T, of T given hours, wage and input is equal to
(3.17) (p3 ( .011 1 ,h 2 ,w) 
g4 (t) exp (v(11 1 +11 2 ,h 1 w+tF(h 2 )+0)
- 2 g4 (y) exp (v(h 1 +11 2 ,h 1 wilF(h 2 )+0)
Y
which demonstrates that 11 is correlated with hours, wage and input through
the preference term, v. The density (3.17) accounts for the fact that tech-
nology, hours and wage are choice variables so that even if the position
attributes are uncorrelated ex ante the corresponding realized values are
correlated with realized technology, T, since their optimal values depend
on the value of T.
Note that it is implicit in model (3.9) and (3.14) that only
capital income I is exogenous. The hours, wage and profit are endogenous.
The extension to households with several adults and more general corner
solutions is in principle straight forward but notationally complex. In
practical empirical work the above formulations, besides their plausible
behavioral interpretation, imply a considerable simplification in cases
where the budget constraint is non-linear and non-convex. This is the case
in most industrialized countries where the tax system implies a rather com-
plicated budget constraint. Another example is particularly relevant,
namely the analyzis of labor supply and agricultural production. In the
latter case the production function (or profit function) enters the budget
constraint.
Although it is possible in principle to circumferent the related
econometric problems within the marginal calculus tradition this tradition
has some severe drawbacks. First, it is only practical for quite restric-
tive functional forms. Second, it requires an instrumental variable app-
roach to acommodate for endogenous marginal wages and shadow prices.
3.2. Extension to the continuous case
This section considers the extension of the model of-the previous
section to the case where the endogenous variables like hours of work and
consumption take values in a continuous space. The continuous version of
the labor supply model introduced above has been developed by Dagsvik
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(1988) and Dagsvik and Strom (1989) and has been estimated on micro data
for Sweden and Norway. Here we shall only review some main properties.
For a more thorough discussion the reader is referred to these papers.
The continuous formulation differs from the finite one in that the
attributes, (H 3 ,1410, and the taste shifter, c j , are assumed generated from
a Poisson process in three dimensions. Unlike the finite formulation the
Poisson process formulation is consistent with the notion of unobserved
heterogeneity both with respect to opportunities and tastes. Recall that
in the finite case above only c j is random. The present formulation states
that ([1 3 ,Vi3 ,e 3 ) are the points of a Poisson process on [0,00)40,..)x(-
with intensity measure
dx(h,w)e-cde
where A is a positive bounded function.
The interpretation of the Poisson process specified here is per-
fectly similar to the familiar formulation on the real line. The realiza-
tions of the process are stochastically independent and the probability
that a point of the process for which
(3.20) ( j E(h,h+dh), W j E(w,w+dw), c j E(c,c+dc))
is (approximately) equal to
(3.21) dX(h,w)
The behavioral interpretation is that the probability that a position for
which (3.20) holds is feasible is given by (3.21). The expected number of
feasible positions within a set Ac R2 xR is given by
A(A) 	 f 6(x,y)e - zdz
A
and the cumulative opportunity distribution is defined by
G(h,w) 	 = 	 ?Ak(11::)
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The supply density that follows from this formulation is analogous
to (3.5) but now the sum is replaced by an integral. Specifically, the
labor supply density, cp, takes the form
(3.22) cp(h,w) - (1-g
1 )exp(v(0,I)) + g l f exp(v(x,xy+I))g 2 (x,y)dxdy
where 1-g 1 = G(0,0) and g 2 (h,w) is the conditional density of G(h,w) given
H.>0. The interpretation of g l is as the fraction of feasible positions
that are wage work positions. g2 (h,w) is the density of feasible wage work
positions.
4. A HOUSEHOLD MODEL FOR RURAL AREAS
4.1. The econometric formulation
This section specifies the decision model for time allocation, con-
sumption and household production in rural areas. The household here is
assumed to consist of at least two adults (more than 15 years of age). We
assume that there are no internal conflicts within the family so that any
household member act so as to maximize a household utility function, which
depends on household consumption and of the respective leisures of the
household members (adults). The household's decision variables are school-
ing, hours of work in different sectors, household size and consumption. As
discussed in section 3 the households choice problem is viewed as one in
which the most preferred position is selected from the (household specific)
set of feasible positions. Recall that given the position then the attri-
butes follow. This means that the basic choice variable is the position.
Before proceeding with the formal econometric model let us introduce the
necessary symbols.
Y i	= Profit of position j (farm and non-farm)
Wj m = (Wj1m,Wj 2m,...) = vector of market wage rates associated
with position j where Wj km is the wage offered to male no.
k in the household.
g 1 g 2 (11,w)exp(v(h,hw+I))
h>0
R jM , HM
**
.F 	 j)j, 	 •
Pa.Pt/
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(41j1F9t4j2F9— ) = vector of market wage rates offered to the
females of the household.
Fl M 	 (n i1m ,R i2m ,..) = vector of male hours of work in the wage
sector associated with position j.
= (11j1F,Rj2F9— ) = vector of female hours of work in the wage
sector.
= (Hj1F,Hj2F9— ) = vector of female hours of work in positi-
114.0 	
on j in non-agricultural selfemployment.
* 	 *
Him	 (H ilm ,H i2m ,..) 	 vector of male hours of work of position j
in non-agricultural selfemployment.
** 	 ** **
Him = 	 = vector of male hours of work of position j
in agricultural selfemployment.
** 	 ** **
HiF = (Hi1m,Hj2m,..) = vector of female hours of work of position
~
j in agricultural selfemployment.
**
H i c 	 H 	Household child hours of work in selfemployment,
position j.
level and type of education associated with position j
F. 	= Family size and composition associated with position j
Q i 	= vector of all the above attributes of position j.
C 	 = Per capita household consumption.
Ti 	= Technology of position j
The household preferences is represented by a utility function
The variables s, f and j represents schooling, family size and the index of
the position. The budget constraints are:
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i) Given the position j, the respective hours of work and the profit
are fixed. The position vector Q. belongs to a household specific
set of feasible attributes.
The economic constraint is given by
(4.1) 	 N i C i = 	 WjkOjkM 	 aljkFnjkF 	 Yj 4-
k 	 k
** * 	 ** * 	 **
(4.2) 	 Y j = F(Him 	 Him, H i + H i F, Hi kc + Hikc) •
where N.C. is the total net income associated with position j, I is otherJ J
income, FOTi is the profit function and Ni is a household equivalence
scale. The household maximize utility subject to (i) and (ii), i.e., it
selects the optimal position from the set of feasible ones. The utility
function conditional on the position attributes is assumed to have the form
	**	 * 	 **
(4.3) 	 U i 	v (H F, H F + H, 	 H. + H. 	 C.	jF , 	jm , 	jm	 jm , 	j	 Fi) + c j
where v is a systematic term and c i is a random term that captures the
effect of unobserved heterogeneity across households and across positions.
The set of feasible position attributes is not observed. Here, this set is
perceived as random due to heterogeneity in opportunities. We represent
this set by the opportunity distribution function, G(q). Specifically G(q)
is, loosely spoken, the fraction of positions with attributes, Q. q, that
is feasible to the household. Let (1)(q) be the distribution of the realized 
attribute vector, i.e. of the attribute vector of the optimal position.
Formally 0 is defined by
1' Ng) 	 = 	 P max U i = max U i .
Qi ''' CI 	 j
Let 'M be the dimension of the position vectors, i.e., Qi e R. The
dimension depends evidently on the household size. Under specific assump-
tions analogous to the ones presented in section 3.1 and 3.2 it follows
that




f ev (Y) dG(y)
f _ev (Y) dG(y)
Rm
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112 • • • qm).
	
** 	 * 	 **
v	 . 	 = 	 vo. 	 H	(Qj	 JF, 	 JF + H , 	jM , HM 	JM, + H.
4.2. Estimation
The estimation is based on a • quasi-maximum likelihood procedure
suggested by McFadden (1978). This method has been applied in Dagsvik and
Strom (1989) and has proven to be efficient  An exact full maximum likeli-
hood procedure based on (4.4) is computationally very costly since it in-
volves the computation of multidimensional integrals. McFadden's procedure
consists in replacing the alternative space, which here is RT by a set
of finite points in RT drawn from a specified probability distribution
(see McFadden, 1978). McFadden has proven that tills method yields consis-
tent estimates. Our application of the method consists in drawing 80 vec-
tors Q i = (log Y i ,log W 1 F, log 14 1 , ni HiF -niF, H i m-Rim) where the
ryr
components are drawn independently, log Y i and the hours of work variables
are drawn from uniform distributions and log W i F and log Wim are drawn
from normal distributions. The resulting modified density which enter the




Trj v 	 g(Qk) + 	 e
v (Q. ) g(Qi)ni
i*k
where Tr i are known weights and Qk denotes the observed attribute vector
for household k.
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4.3. Specification of the opportunity density
The offered hours and wage distributions are assumed independent
across household members. As in (3.10)-(3.14) we assume no constraints on
hours given that hours are positive, which mean that for individual k,
* ** 	 ** *
(H. k , . k . 
k
H+R ) are uniformly 	 Aistributed 	 on 	 Hik+Hik>0,
*J 
Hjk+Hjki-fijON. The offered wage density conditional on Rik >
normal with expectation.
(4.5) 	 E log Wjk 	
74	 DO k 	 (SPLYRSC1+SPLYRSC2)D ik + SPLYRSC3 • - 2 k
where
(x,0,0) 	 if )(.5
(SPLYRSC1, SPLYRSC2, SPLYRSC3) 	 = 	 (5,x-5,0) 	 if 5<x.Q0
(5,5,x-10) if x>10.
The opportunity mass that corresponds to the corner solutions is
gFk = P{lijkF > 0 } ,
** 	 **
gF k = P{HjkF > 0 )
k = P{FlikF > 0 ) ,
gM k = P{Hj k M
** **
gF k = Pflij k M
	
k 	 P{Flj k M
The interpretation is that gFk is the fraction of wage work positions that
are feasible for woman k of the household. The other terms are interpre-
ted analogously. It is implicit in the definitions above that the respec-
tive amounts of feasible positions are independent across family members.
This assumption could be relaxed at the cost of econometric simplicity.
The probabilities g F , gm , g F and gm are specified as logit functi-
ons of the respective individual levels of education.






log Y i = ao 	al log(1 + I(Hikm + Hilo ))
k
* 	 ** 	 * 	 **+ a2 og(1 + I(HikF + HF)) 	a3 log(1Iffl-1" 	 ‘ jkC 	 jkC))
k 	 k
** 	 **
+ a4 log(1 4- /(HikF 4- Hila)) 10g( 1 4- Ialikm 4- Hikm))
k 	 k
+ a5 log(1 + TOTWET) + a6 log(1 + TOTDRIED)
+ a7 MAXED + Ti
where
TOTWET 	 is total area of watered land worked by household
TOTDRIED is total area of dry land worked by household
MAXED 	 is years of schooling of most educated household member
older than 15 years.
and T. are supposed to account for unobserved choice variables that affect
the production technology. The distribution of the technology attribute,
Ti, is assumed to be normal N(0,t), and it is assumed to be independent
of other input factors. In other words the fractions of T-attributes with
values less than or equal to t equals the cumulative normal distribution
function with zero mean and variance t 2 .
By (4.6) " and the assumption about Ti we are able to express the
conditional opportunity density for Y i given the observable input attri-
bute.
4.4. Specification of the preferences
The systematic term, v, of the utility function is assumed to have
the form:
22
(4.7) 	 v(h,fi ,C,f,S)




+ 	 (a4 + a5 i og Ajm 	 a8( 1 og .M )2)
J
+ I (a8 + a9 log Ai F 	 al 0 (log Ai
A
4- an 	 hiFfi 	 a12 	 Djm 	 v(S)
where 	L i r is defined by
h j r
r = F,M,L j r 	 8760
C 	 = households per capita household consumption,
fj = number of children less than six years,
Ajr = Age of household member j, sex r = F,M,
hir = total annual hours of work for household member j, sex r
H iF = annual hours of wage work, female j,
and
J 1 if male j has annual hours of work in (2475, 2525)
Djm = 	 0 otherwise
A
V(S) = utility component of schooling. (This component will not be
estimated)
Except for the term all giF fi , utility is assumed additively sepa-
j
rable in consumption and leisure. Note that the utility of consumption is
concave and increasing when a l < 1, a3 < 1, a7 < 1 when
a4 + a5 1 ogAj + a6 (logAi ) 2 > O
and
a8 + a9 logAi + 	 o (logAi F ) 2 >
The dummy variable, DM, allows males to have a particular preference for
total hours of work in the interval (2575, 2525). The motivation for
introducing this dummy is that the data show a marked consentration of







as in farm and non-farm selfemployment. This can only occur if
i) The males have a particular preference for "full-time" hours,
ii) If there are constraints on hours i.e., that there are more full-
time work positions relative to other positions
	
iii) 	 If the data are corrupted by measurement errors.
The reason why we have specified number of children solely in
interaction with wage work hours is because selfemployment activities often
can be combined with childcate.
The estimated model is consistent with all these explanations but
we are not able to identify which is the true one.
4.5. Estimation results
This section resports the estimates of the model parameters. 	 As
mentioned above a simultaneous maximum likelihood procedure is applied.
Despite the complexity of the model this is possible through the applica-
tion of McFadden's method (1978). First we report summary statistics in
table 1.
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Mean 	 ation of mean
HOUSEHOLD STATISTICS
Number of households
Consumption per capita 	 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Female hours of work in wage work • • • •
Female hours of work in selfemployment
Male hours of work in wage work 	 • • • • • • •
Male hours of work in selfemployment ........
Childrens hours of work in selfemployment
Total gross revenue from selfemployment
Total profit from selfemployment
Number of children below 7 	 .........
Number of children 7-14 	 .......... ...........
Number of females 15-70 	 ......... ........
Number of males 15-70 .... . 	 ...... .......
Number of people above 70 	 OOOOO




























Number of females 15-70, 2087
Number of males 15-70, 2057
Participation rates in 
wage work for females ........ •••• ......... . 	 0.07 	 0.01
selfemployment for femals .... •••••••• .... . . . . 	 0.85 	 0.01
wage work for males ••••••••••• . ••••• ... . . . . . 4. 	 0.34 	 0.01
selfemployment for males .. •••••••••••• ..... . . 	 0.89 	 0.01
Hours of work in 
wage work for females  	 67 	 7
selfemployment for females  	 1477 	 25
wage work for males  	 387 	 17
selfemployment for males 	 1777 	 25
Wage rate, females  	 7.38 	 2.45
Wage rate, males  	 2.98 	 0.30
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Table 2. Parameter estimates of the utility function for rural areas









 a3 	-7.680	 14.9
	










a11 	 -0.152 	 2.2
al 2 	 2.231 	 19.7
Table • Parameter estimates of the conditional profit function for the
rural areas.*) The simultaneous estimation procedure and OLS
Variables
	 OLS 	 Simultaneous
ML estimates
	
Intercept .. • • • • ..................... 	 4.246 	 (7.1) 	 2.181 	 (2.5)
	Male labor .......................... 	 0.329 	 (4.3) 	 0.543 	 (4.9)
Female labor .... 	 . 	 • 	 .. 	 0.222 (2.7) 	 0.393 (3.4)
Interaction between male and female
labor ...'.... ............. 	 ..... 	 -0.031 	 (3.0) 	 -0.053 	 (3.5)
	
Child labor .................... • 	 -0.0004 (0.4) 	 -0.010 	 (0.7)
Watered land .	an ... ..................... 	 0.419 	 (7.5) 	 0.443 	 (5.2)
Dry land .... 	 • • •• • 	 •• • • • • 	 • • 	 0.264 	 (7.6) 	 0.249 	 (4.8)
Maxed ... .... 	 • 	 ...... 	 ..... 	 0.578 	 (9.7) 	 0.734 	 (7.3)





The estimates of the parameters of the utility function imply that
the systematic term of the utility function is strictly concave and in-
creasing in consumption. -
The parameters associated with the conditional profit function
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given in the third column of table 3 differ partly from the estimates ob-
tained by OLS. Recall that the OLS estimates may be biased (simultaneous
equation bias) while the ML estimates are obtained by a procedure that
takes into account that the input factors are endogenous. Observe that
these estimates all have the correct sign. The effect of male and female
labor seem to be underestimated by the OLS estimation procedure. The coef-
ficient of Maxed also seems to be underestimated by OLS.
Table 4. Wage equations. Simultaneous ML estimation procedure*) versus OLS
Males 	 Females
Simul- 	 Simul-
OLS 	 taneous ML 	 OLS 	 taneous ML
Intercept ... • • • • • ••••••• 	 0.352 	 0.395 	 0.473 	 0.451
(6.2) 	 (5.4) 	 (4.0) 	 (3.2)
SPLYRSC1+SPLYRSC2 ... . ... 	 0.040 	 0.034 	 - 	 -
(3.5) 	 (2.3)
SPLYRSC3 ... .. ........... 	 0.284 	 0.306 	 0.303 	 0.540
(6.1) 	 (4.8) 	 (3.0) 	 (3.4)
Standard error •••••••••• 	 0.888 	 0.933 	 1.856 	 1.316
(34.4) 	 (17.7)
R2 ......... . 	 0.09 	 0.06• • • • ••••••••
*) t-values in parenthesis.
The ML parameter estimates of the wage functions seem to be close to the
corresponding OLS estimate apart from the coefficient of SPLYRSC3 for
females which seems to be underestimated by OLS.
Non-agricultural selfemploy-
ment, females ••••••••••••• 	 log
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Table 5. Estimates*) of the opportunity probabilities for Rural areas
SECTOR
	
Agricultural selfemployment 	 **
glM 	males .................... 	 log( 	 **) 	 = 	 1.932
	
1-g 1m 	 (24.0)
Non-agricultural selfemploy-





glM 	Wage work, males .. ......... 	 log( 	 ) 	 -0.545 + 0.042S
	
1-g 1m 	 (5.5) 	 (1.9)
	Agricultural selfemployment, 	 **
glF	females ..•••••••••••••••• 	 log( 	 *0 	1.656
	1- g1F 	 (24.0)
= 	 -0.516
(9.4)




= Length of schooling.
t-values in parenthesis.
Table 5 shows that schooling as measured here) only has significant effect






Figure 1. Observed and simulated distributions of annual hours of work for












Figure 2. Observed and simulated distributions of annual hours of work for
males living in rural areas.
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Figure 3. Observed and simulated distributions of per capita consumption among
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Figures 1, 2 and 3 give the observed and the simulated distribu-
tions of consumption and hours of work for males and females for the rural
areas. The figures show that the model reproduces the observed distribu-
tions quite well.
5. A HOUSEHOLD MODEL FOR LINA
5.1. Specification of the mode 
The specification of the structural part of the utility function is
the same as the one for the rural areas given by (4.7).
We have specified a profit function 	 conditional on labor input.
Specifically, we assume for Y i >0
* ** 	 * 	 ** 	 * 	 **
(5 .1) 	 log Y . = ao +a 10g(14.1(Hjkm+Hjkm))-1-a210g(1-1-1(HjkF Hjkr i" Hj C HjkC))
k 	 - 	 k
* 	 ** 	 * 	 ** * 	 **
	-1-a310g(1+I(Hjkm+H j km))10g(1+I(Hj 	 c H j kc))
k 	 k
+a MAXED+Ti
where T. is normal NO,* T i is as above supposed to account for un-
observed variables that characterize the production technology and the
environment.
Furthermore, the probability of positive profit is introduced by
P{Y i >0}.
The rationale behind g s is that in addition to a limited set of feasible
selfemployment positions is the fact that a successful business does not
necessarily yield positive profit through every period. In fact the data
demonstrates that profit is negative for some households during the period
of the data collection. We may interpret g s alternatively as the (average)
fraction of the year the business is likely to operate with positive
profit. A rigorous treatment of the choice of selfemployment activity would
of course require a model for decision under uncertainty.
Finally, let gy be the fraction of all feasible positions that are
'selfemployment positions for the household. Let g r be the fraction of
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feasible positions for an individual of sex r, r=F,M, that are non-farm
**
selfemployment positions. Let g r and g r be defined analogously as the
corresponding opportunity probabilities for farm selfemployment and wage
work, respectively.
A convenient parametrization of gy is
1 - g -
 a+(1-a)
where
* 	 ** Mr
TI 	 [(1-gr)(1-gr )1
r=F,M
and mF , mm are the numbers of females and males in the household and a>0 is
a parameter. The case a=1 corresponds to the case in which all selfemploy-
ment opportunity sets are independent across household members.
5.2. Estimation results
Here we report the estimation results for Lima. The first table
displays household and individual sample statistics.
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Table 6. Household and individual sample statistics, Lima
Standard devi-
Variables 	 Mean ation of mean
HOUSEHOLD STATISTICS
Number of households 898
	Consumption per capita ....... ...... ............ 	 6900 	 150
	Female hours of work in wage work ............ 	 832 	 44
	Female hours of work in selfemployment .. ..... 	 638 	 44
	Male hours of work in wage work •••••••••••• . • 	 2171 	 61
	Male hours of work in selfemployment ......... 	 907 	 50
	
Childrens hours of work in selfemployment .... 	 53 	 10
	Total gross revenue from selfemployment .... • • 	 10700 	 600
Total profit from selfemployment ... 	 ... 	 6300 	 400
Number of children below 7 • • • .. 	 ....... 	 0.84 	 0.03
Number of children 7-14 • 	 .................... 	 1.08 	 0.04
Number of females 15-70• • 	 ... mi..-- 	 1.79 	 0.04
	Number of males 15-70 ... ............. .. .... 	 1.71 	 0.03
Number of people above 70 . . . ..... 	 ........ 	 0.09 	 0.01
Equivalence scale 	 • • • • • 	 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . 	 4 	 0.10
INDIVIDUAL STATISTICS
Number of females 15-70, 1611
Number of males 15-70, 1539
Participation rates in 
wage work for females .. 	 ............ 	 0.32 	 0.01
selfemployment for females .. • • . • .. 	 ..... 	 0.35 	 0.01
wage work for males .. 	 ........ 	 0.63 	 0.01
selfemployment for males ................ 	 0.35 	 0.01
Hours of work in 
wage work for females ... • • . 	 ............. 	 463 	 21
sel fempl oyment for femal es 	 ........ ... 	 356 	 20
wage work for males ........... 	 .......... 	 1267 	 32
selfemployment for males .. 	 • 	 529 	 27
Wage rate, females 	 • OOOOO . OOOOOOO ......... 	 5.25 	 0.40
Wage rate, males .. 	 • 	 .............. 	 6 .41 	0 .20
Consumption
	j a, 	 -0.776 	 7.9
	a 2 	4.832	 7.3
1 a3 -3.605 9.5a4 43.258 5.4a6 -23.194 5.3a6 	3.134	 4.1
a7 	-1.454	 5.7
a8 	 6.655	 5.5
a9 	-46.354	 5.3
1 0 	6.369	 3.2
an 	 -0.149 	 2.3







Table 7. Parameter estimates for the utility function. Lima
Variables 	 Coefficients 	 Estimates 	 t-values




OLS 	 taneous ML 	 OLS 	 taneous ML
Intercept ... . . . . . . ... 	 0.049 	 -0.105 	 -0.596 	 -0.674
(0.4) 	 (0.8) 	 (3.5) 	 (3.8)
SPLYRSC1+SPLYRSC2 	 .... 	 0.092 	 0.100 	 0.126 	 0.125
(8.4) 	 (8.2) 	 (8.2) 	 (7.9)
SPLYRSC3 ... ............. 	 0.117 	 0.136 	 0.126 	 0.150
(10.1) 	 (9.9) 	 (6.2) 	 (6.5)
Experience .. . . . . . . ...... 	 0.050 	 0.038 	 0.056 	 0.050
(8.8) 	 (5.7) 	 (5.7) 	 (5.0)
(Experience) 2 /100 ... . . . . 	 -0.060 	 -0.039 	 -0.073 	 -0.063
(5.3) 	 (3.1) 	 (3.5) 	 (3.1)
.
Standard error .. . ... .... 	 0.659 	 0.660 	 0.780 	 0.753
(40.4) 	 (32.9)
R2 	0.27	 0.25
*) t-values in parenthesis.
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Table 9. Parameter estimates of the conditional profit function given
positive profit. The simultaneous estimation procedure*) and OLS
Simultaneous
Variable 	 OLS 	 ML estimates
Intercept ....... . . . 	 ... 	 2.681 	 (5.9) 	 3.078 	 (7.1)
Male labor ......... ..... .... 	 0.756 	 (13.3) 	 0.572 	 (10.5)
Female labor ......•••••••••• 	 0.656 	 (11.0) 	 0.487 	 (8.7)
Interaction, female-male labor 	 -0.085 	 (9.8) 	 -0.061 	 (7.6)
Maxed 	 ..................... 	 0.047 	 (2.4) 	 0.072 	 (4.0)
Standard erro  ..••••••••••••1.356 	 1.257 	 (31.9)
R2 .. ........ 	 .......... 	 0.33
*) t-values in parenthesis.
g s












9 1M log( 	 **) 	 -2.804
	
1-g 1m 	 (19.3)
Non-agricultural selfemploy-
glM ment, males ..•••••••••••• 	 log( 	 * ) -0.197
(2.5)
glM Wage work, males .. ......... 	 log( 	 ) 	 = 	 -0.488 + 0.103S
(2.6) 	 (5.4)
Agricultural selfemployment, 	 **
glF females .... .............. 	 log( 	 **) 	 = 	 -1.198
	1- g1F 	 (12.5)
Non-agricultural selfemploy- 	 *
glF ment, females .... ........ . 	 log( 	 * ) 	 = 	 0.007
	1- g1F 	 (0.1)
glF Wage work, females 	 ..... 	 log( 	 ) 	 = 	 -1.236 + 0.152S
	1- g1F 	 (7.0) 	 (8.1)
Household profit from self-
employment 	 ..... 	
• . • .
	 log a -0.550
(4.4)
S = Length of schooling.
*) t-values in parenthesis.
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Table 7 demonstrates that the parameters of the utility function
all have the correct sign according to economic theory and they are in
general determined with high precision.
The results of Table 8 demonstrate that education and experience
are very important determinants for the wage rate in the wage work sector.
It also shows that the so-called selectivity bias is negligible. This is
not the case for the profit function estimates given in Table 9. Here we
see that the direct effect of both male and female labor is overestimated
by OLS.
The profit-function estimates also imply that the Cobb-Douglas
structure is rejected since there is a strong negative interaction between
male and female hours of work. In contrast to the result for the rural
areas Maxed (the length of schooling of the highest educated member of the
family) seems to be of little importance for the level of the profit.
The estimates of the opportunity probabilities given in Table 10
show that length of schooling has a substantial effect on the opportunities
for wage work, particularly for females. The last line of Table 10 also
shows that the probability of positive profit given that selfemployment
activity takes place is 0.87.
The Figures 4, 5 and 6 yield the observed and the simulated distri-
butions of consumption and hours of work for females and males in Lima.
These figures demonstrate that the model reproduces data quite well on the
aggregate level.
41111111.1111•,...
200 	 1000 	 2000
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Figure 4. Observed and simulated distributions of hours of work for

























Figure 5. Observed and simulated distributions of hours of work for




Figure 6. Observed and simulated distributions of per capita consumption























6. POLICY SIMULATION RESULTS FOR LIMA
The • econometric framework outlined in Section 3 allows us to
perform rather complex simulation experiments where we take into account
observed heterogeneity that stem from age, schooling, household size and
composition. In addition, we account for unobserved heterogeneity that is
represented in the model by random error terms associated with the wage,
the conditional profit and the utility function. After the model has been
estimated it is possible to perform simulations since we then "known the
parameters of the structural part of the utility, the wage and the profit
function, and the probability distributions of the related random terms.
In practical policy simulation experiments we proceed as follows.
For each household the respective random terms are drawn from the corre-
sponding probability distributions. Now the maximization of the utility
function is a pure numerical problem given the observed household characte-
ristics. The resulting hours that maximize utility are the females and the
males labor supply in each sector. This procedure is performed for each
household in the sample from which we obtain the participation rates, the
population distribution of the labor supply in each sector, the consumption
and the profit from selfemployment. Note that this procedure implies exact 
aggregation. Unfortunately, since the model is so rich it turned out to be
quite costly to perform exact simulations. We have therefore only carried
out approximate simulations in which the approximation error is of moderate
size. These approximate simulations are still quite good as seen from the
figures 1-6.
In this section we confine the analysis to households with at least
one female and one male adult where the households consumption per capita
does not exceed 20 000 Intis.
The simulation experiments that are undertaken here relate to the
effect of changes in wage rates and education on labor supply, wage earn-
ings, profit from selfemployment. The welfare implications are reported in
Aaberge and Dagsvik (1989).
6.1. Wage effects
In Table 11 we report the effect of wage changes on participation
probabilities and on mean hours worked in each sector. The table shows that
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a 20 per cent increase has only a small effect on labor supply. A 20 per
cent wage increase for the females implies that their mean hours of work
and participation rate in the wage sector increase by 5.8 and 3.2 per cent,
respectively. The effect on females mean hours and participation rate in
selfemployment is almost negligible. Also the cross effect on males parti-
cipation rates and mean hours of work in each sector is negligible.
Recall that the sum of the participation rates across sectors may
be greater than one because many individuals work in both sectors. When the
males wage rates are increased by 20 per cent, participation and mean hours
of work for males in the wage sector increase by 1.6 and 2.7 per cent, res-
pectively. For the selfemployment sector, male participation and mean hours
of work decrease by 1.2 and 2 per cent, respectively. Female participation
and mean hours of work are reduced by 2.0 and 2.4 per cent in the self-
employment sectors. The reason why female labor supply decreases is due to
the income effect that stem from the increase in male wage earnings. When
both male and female wage rates are increased by 20 per cent, the impact is
similar but weaker.
The largest effect is obtained when the females wage rates are in-
creased by 20 per cent of the mean wage rate. Then participation and mean
hours in wage work increase by 3.8 and 8.0 per cent, respectively. By using
the results of Table 11 we obtain that the mean hours, given participation
in the wage work sector, increases by 4.0 per cent. However, the decrease
in participation and mean hours in the selfemployment sector is small. So
is also the change in male labor supply from this policy.
When males wage rates are increased by 20 per cent of the mean wage
rate then males participation and hours of work in the wage sector increase
by 2.1 and 3.8 per cent, respectively. In the selfemployment sector male
participation and mean hours decrease by 2.3 and 3.5 per cent. The corre-
sponding income effect implies that female participation and mean hours in
the wage sector decrease by 2.9 and 3.6 per cent, respectively, while there







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12. Simulation of the model without random elements in the model and
without restrictions on the choice set of positions. Base case,
Lima
Wage rates	 Hours in
	 Hours in
in Intis	 wage work
	
selfemployment
Male Female	 Male Female
	 Male Female
	1	 1 	 790 	 0 	 861 	 118
	
1 	 3 	 114 	 808 	 991 	 58
	
1 	 5 	 0 	 1113 	 762 	 40
	
1 	 7 	 . 0 	 1192 	 574 	 31
	
3 	 1 	 2027, 	 0 	 193 	 87
	
3 	 3 	 2027 	 0 	 193 	 87
	
3 	 5 	 1707 	 536 	 198 	 56
	
3 	 7 	 1327 	 857 	 201 	 37
,
	
5 	 1 	 2140 	 0 	 93 	 49
	
5 	 3 	 2140 	 0 	 93 	 49
	
5 	 5 	 2140 	 0 	 93 	 49
	
5 	 7 	 1963 	 307 	 92 	 38
	
7 	 1 	 2130 	 0 	 54 	 29
	
7 	 3 	 2130 	 0 	 54 	 29
	
7 	 5 	 2130 	 0 	 54 	 29
	
7 	 7 	 2130 	 0 	 54 	 29
	
9 	 1 	 2091 	 0 	 33 	 18
9 	 3 	 2091 	 0 	 33 	 18
9 	 5 	 2091 	 0 	 33 	 18
9 	 7 	 2091 	 0 	 33 	 18
9 	 9 	 2091 	 0 	 33 	 18
9 	 11 	 2087 	 7 	 33 	 18
	
11 	 1 	 2046 	 0 	 22 	 11
	
11 	 3 	 2046 	 0 	 22 	 11
	
11 	 5 	 2046 	 0 	 22 	 11
	
11 	 7 	 2046 	 0 	 22 	 11
	
11 	 9 	 2046 	 0 	 22 	 11
	
11 	 11 	 2046 	 0 	 22 	 11
Transfers = 2400 inits, Maxed is equal to mean level of years of schooling
Female age = male age = 30 years
Number og children = 0
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Table 13. Wage elasticities for the model without random elements and
without restrictions on the choice set positions. Lima
Male wage increase 	 Female wage increase
Base level 	 Wage work 	 Self- 	 Wage work 	 Self-
of wage rate 	 sector 	 employment 	 sector 	 employment
in Intis 	 sector 	 sector
F 	M	 F 	 M 	 F 	M	 F
	1	 1 	 2.8 	 0 	 -1.5 	 0.8	 o 	 0 	 o 	 o
	 	 3 	 28.0 	 -0.5 	 -1.7 	 1.7 	 -12.3 	 1.2 	 0.2 	 -1.7
	
1 	 5 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 0 	 0.3 	 -0.7 	 -2.5
	
1 	 7 	 0 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 0 	 0.2 	 -0.9 	 0
	
3 	 1 	 0.2 	 0 	 -1.6 	 -1.1 	 0 	 0 	 o 	 o
	3	 3 	 0.2 	 0 	 -1.6 	 -1.1 	 0 	 0 	 o 	 0
	
3 	 5 	 0.7 	 -2 	 -1.5 	 0 	 -0.8 	 2.2 	 o 	 0
	
3 	 7 	 1.1 	 -0.8 	 -1.5 	 2.7 	 -1.0 	 0.9 	 o 	 o
	5	 1 	 0.05 	 0 	 -2.2 	 -2.0 	 o 	 o 	 0 	 o
	 	 3 	 0.05 	 0 	 -2.2 	 -2.0 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o
	5	 5 	 0.05 	 0 	 -2.2 	 -2.0 	 0 	 0 	 o 	 o
	 	 7 	 0.50 -4.6 	 -1.0 	 0 	 -0.5 	 4.2 	 0 	 .-2.6
	
7 	 r 	 -0.05 	 0 	 -1.9 	 0 	 o 	 o 	 0 	 o
	7	 3 	 -0.05 	 0 	 -1.9 	 0 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o
	 	 5 	 -0.05 	 0 	 -1.9 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 o 	 o
	7	 7 	 -0.05 	 0 	 -1.9 	 0 	 0 	 o 	 o 	 0
	9	 1 	 -0.1 	 0 	 -2.1 	 -2.2 	 o 	 o 	 0 	 o
	 	 3 	 -0.1 	 0 	 -2.1 	 -2.2 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 0
	
9 	 5 	 -0.1 	 0 	 -2.1 	 -2.2 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0
9- 	 7 	 -0.1 	 0 	 -2.1 	 -2.2 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 0
	
9 	 9 	 -0.1 	 0 	 -2.1 	 -2.2 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 o
	9	 11 	 -0.1 	 100 	 -2.0 	 -1.7 	 -0.4 221.2 	 -0.3 	 -1.7
	
11 	 1 	 -0.13 	 0 	 -2.3 	 -2.6 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0
	
11 	 3 	 -0.13 	 0 	 -2.3 	 -2.6 	 0 	 o 	 o 	 o
	11	 5 	 -0.13 	 0 	 -2.3 	 -2.6 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o
	11	 7 	 -0.13 	 0 	 -2.3 	 -2.6 	 o 	 o 	 o 	 o
	11	 9 	 -0.13 	 0 	 -2.3 	 -2.6 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0
	
11 	 11 	 -0.13 	 0 	 -2.3 	 -2.6 	0	 0 	 0 	 0
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Note that above we only reported aggregate effects. In Tables 12
and 13 we report labor supply and wage elasticities, respectively, based on
simulations for a two-person family for the particular case in which all
the random terms are equal to zero and without any choice constraints.
These simulations demonstrate that the elasticities of hours are highly
dependent on wage rate levels. The reason why the corresponding aggregate
effects are much smaller may be the large heterogeneity in wage rates and
the fact that in many families one or several persons are "stuck" in corner
solutions i.e., they participate at most in one sector. Such families are
therefore less responsive to wage changes compared to families where all
members work in both sectors. Table 13 shows that when male and female wage
rates are equal to 1 and 3, 9 and 11 intis, respectively, the elasticities
are very high. In the latter case wage work hours for females increases
from 7 to 23 hours. In addition, as we shall see below, the restrictions on
choice opportunities are very important for the occurence of a large number
of corner solutions.
6.2. Education effects
In Table 14 we report the impact of schooling through the oppor-
tunity probabilities. Here the wage rates and the education variable
(Maxed) in the conditional profit function are kept unchanged. Thus we
study the pure "opportunity" effect. Contrary to the wage simulations above
we obtain a large effect from increased education. If female education is
increased by one year, female participation increases by 9.2 per cent in
the wage sector. The change in the participation rate for the selfemploy-
ment sector is however within the simulation error margin. If male
education is increased by one year participation in wage work increases by
3.4 per cent and remains almost unchanged for the selfemployment sector. If
the minimum education for females is increased to 9 years, female
participation increases by 19 per cent. When the males level of schooling
is increased analogously male participation in the wage sector increases by
3.9 per cent. The cross effects appear to be negligible.
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Table 14. Changes in sectorspecific participation rates as a result of
additional schooling when the wage rates are kept fixed.
Percentage changes from base case
Sectorspecific participation rates
Wage work 	 Selfemployment
F 	M	 F
Base case 	 0.32 	 0.62 	 0.34 	 • 0.35




One year of additional schooling
for males 	 -1.3 	 3.4
	
-0.6
One year of additional schooling





Nine years of schooling as a lower
limit for females 	 • 19.0 	 -1.0
	
-0.3
Nine years of schooling at a lower
limit for males 	 -1.3 	 3.9
	
-0.9
Nine years of schooling as a lower





In Table 15 we also report the impact on labor supply from in-
creased education. Here only maxed is kept unchanged. In other words, the
increase in schooling has an effect both through increased wage levels as
well as through expanded choice sets of wage work positions. The first line
demonstrates that the wage effect seems to be small compared to the impact
through the opportunity probabilities. In Table 14 we found that the corre-
sponding female participation rate increased by 19 per cent which is only
2.5 percentage points less than what we obtained by increasing minimum
level of schooling up to nine years for the females without keeping the
wage rate fixed. The subsequent effect on mean hours of work in the wage
sector is a 25.6 per cent increase for the females and a 2.7 per cent de-
crease for the males. The corresponding increase in the conditional mean
hours given participation in the wage work sector for females is 3.3 per
cent. The other income and cross effects on hours are small. The mean wage



















































































































































































































































































































































If the minimum level of schooling for males is increased up to 9
years the impact on labor supply is much less. In this case participation
in the wage work sector increases by 5.6 per cent for males and reduces by
3.5 per cent for females. Mean hours of work in the wage work sector
increases by 6.7 per cent for the males and reduces by 4.4 per cent for the
females. Other income and cross effects on labor supply are small. Con-
cerning wage earnings, they increase in this case by 14.8 per cent for
males and decrease by 5.0 per cent for females. However, the total effect
on household income is larger in this case than in the former case where
minimum education for females was 9 years.
The last line reports the effect from letting both males and
females have minimum education equal to 9 years. The results show that
female participation and mean hours in wage work increase by almost the
same amount as in the "marginal" case reported in the first line. Male par-
ticipation and mean hours in the wage work sector increase by 3.7 and 3 per
cent, respectively, which is much less than the response in the "marginal"
case of the second line.
We have also carried out simulations in which Maxed is increased.
The results from these simulations (not reported here) show very small
impact on the profit.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper departs from the assumption that the members of a house-
hold behave so as to maximize a household utility function given the avail-
able resources, work and production opportunities. The corresponding econo-
metric model we propose here differ from the traditional labor supply
models found in the literature. Our particular approach has the advantage
of being well suited for taking into account latent opportunity con-
straints, the interdependence between each persons activities in different
sectors and the interdependence between household members. Since quite a
few households consist of more than two adults this is a major challenge.
As mentioned in the introduction it may not be obvious that a neo-
classical type of model which we have used here is appropriate for analys-
ing the Peruvian labor market. However, we have not discussed the limita-
tion of the micro-economic neo-classical modeling approach to this end. Our
analysis rests however critically on the presumption that the heterogeneity
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with respect to preferences and opportunities is to a "large" extent re-
flected in the data. For example, it may be questionable if essential back-
ground information about the heterogeneity in customs and value systems
across social classes, ethnic groups and "professions" is reflected in the
data. It is of course also essential that the data on participation, hours
and economic variables are not corrupted by measurement errors. Measurement
errors in the economic variables may occur if, for instance, household
members are engaged in black market activities or if a substantial part of
the goods and labor markets operate by trading services and goods without
explicit prices. This is particularly relevant if the inflation is high
like in Peru. Note, however, that consumption of home-grown food and other
in-kind income is given a monetary value so that profit include consumption
of these items. Specifically, the assumption underlying our model is that
profit, hours and wage rates are reasonably accurately measured. Also we
assume that the number of feasible wage work positions with low (offered)
hours is, on average, the same as the number of feasible wage work posi-
tions with high offered hours. Under the assumption that there are no re-
strictions on hours of work in the selfemployment sector it is in fact pos-
sible to test this assumption.
If, however, we are willing to accept the neo-classical point of
departure the estimation results at least for Lima demonstrate that the
parameters are determined with remarkably precision and have the expected
signs according to economic theory. The model is also able to reproduce
quite well the aggregate distributions of hours and consumption.
In order to examine the possibility of constraints on hours in the
wage work sector we have also carried out a rough test of this assumption.
This test suggests that the wage work hours are not severely constrained.
As regards the empirical results it may be the case that the model
for the rural areas is less able to capture the corresponding economic
reality and behavioral patterns than the version for Lima. This may be so
because it seems questionable if the data on key economic variables are
sufficiently accurate. Also the large heterogeneity makes it hard to model
the activities in the rural areas. This may be the reason ,why simulation
experiments (not reported here) show that wage changes have no effect on
behavior in the rural areas.
The simulation results for Lima demonstrate that proportional wage
changes have only a small effect on behavior (indirect effect), see Aaberge
and Dagsvik (1989), which also report the effects of changes in wage rates
and education on the distribution of welfare.
Last 7 days 	 Last 12 months
Weekly Weekly 	 Weekly Weekly
hours 	 wage 	 Number 	 hours 	 wage 	 Number
of work earnings of weeks of work earnings of weeks
Main job
Second job
h 1 	k1 	r 1 	 h2 	 k2
h3 	k3	 r3 	 h4 	 k4
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APPENDIX 1
Definitions of main variables
The Peruvian Living Standards Survey records information on the two
most important jobs held by each individual in the last 7 days and in the
last 12 months prior to the survey, respectively. Accordingly, this survey
provides information about cases where the individual held one main job in
the last 7 days and another main job in the last 12 months and similar in-
formation for second jobs. Therefore annual hours of work and wage earnings
is defined by (A.1) and (A.2).










annual wage earnings 	 2 r i
1=1
-As an illustration we give examples of three possible outcomes
h , 	 r1 and r2 in Table A2.
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Table A2. Three examples of observations of main job activities in the
course of 12 months





hours 	 Number 	 hours 	 Number
of work 	 of weeks 	 of work 	 of weeks
1
	
40 	 ' 50 	 0 	 0
2
	
0 	 0 	 40 	 50
3
	
40 	 28 	 30 	 24
Based on the measurements of wage earnings and annual hours of work
the wage rate is given by
wage rate -= Annual earnings 
Annual hours of work in wage sector •
Table A3 gives details of how profits from farm and non-farm pro-
duction are measured.
Table A3. Measure of profits from farm and non-farm production
NON-FARMFARM
TOTREV





EXPENSES = (TOTAL MTHLY EXPENSES*NO.
MTHS ENTERPRISE OPER IN LAST YEAR)









1) Only households with at least two adults, one of each sex, (between 15-
70 years of age are considered.
) Households with zero or negative profit from selfemployment are re-
moved.
3) Households for which any adult works more than 5000 hours are removed.
4) Households for which any adult has wage rate above 375 intis are re-
moved
5) Households with gross revenue above 100000 intis are removed
6) Household with consumption per capita above 20000 and below 30 intis
are removed.
Lima: 
1), 3), 4), and 5) hold.
7) Households with positive profit and zero hours in selfemployment are
removed.
Households with negative profit are removed
Households with consumption per capita above 20000 intis are removed
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